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ABSTRACT 
In this article, I set off to explore the question “What is belief?” from a first-person perspective. 
Finding the explanations in analytical philosophy insufficient, I delve into the phenomenological 
tradition – starting with Edmund Husserl’s concept of the horizon. In doing so, I find that the 
phenomenological tradition seems to contradict the presupposition of beliefs as representations. 
Directing my attention to finding an alternative explanation, I present Hubert Dreyfus’ explanation of 
learning without representations, but show that (by Dreyfus’ own admission) he does not truly take a 
decisive step away from representationalism. I present the idea of enaction as a proper alternative to 
representations. Within this new framework, I present the idea of sense-making as a potential 
direction towards an answer to the question at hand. 
KEY WORDS 
belief, representation, phenomenology, enaction 
CLASSIFICATION 
APA: 2340, 2380 
JEL: D83, D84, Z19
Belief without representation 
243 
INTRODUCTION 
We tend to judge ourselves by our intent, we tend to judge others by their behavior. 
Stephen M.R. Covey 
Contemporary analytic philosophy understands belief as a propositional attitude – a mental 
state of having a certain attitude towards a proposition or the state of affairs described by the 
proposition, specifically, the attitude of regarding the proposition (or state of affairs) to be 
true. Beliefs are assumed to play a causal role in the production of behaviour. Indeed, many 
branches of analytic philosophy of belief deal primarily with behaviour (such as 
dispositionalism, interpretationalism and functionalism) and the criteria required in order to 
attribute belief to a behaving being [1] (most notable example of this being [2]). 
The stance of analytic philosophy on belief (before behaviour) is varied, but what is 
commonly accepted is the representationalist assumption that in a believing being’s head or 
mind there are representations with the same (propositional) content as the belief. 
Accounts quickly diverge regarding what these representations look like. Beliefs (and their 
representations) are sometimes regarded as occurring in the form of sentences in an internal 
language of thought [2], but this proves problematic when considering the sheer number of 
beliefs (i.e. sentences) that would need to be stored within the mind [1]. To borrow Eric 
Schwitzgebel’s [1] example: if I believe that our solar system has 8 planets, then I should also 
believe that it has less than 9 planets, and less than 10 planets and so on ad infinitum. This 
(easily generalizable) example alone would amount to an infinite number of sentences taking 
up an infinite amount of space in the believing mind. This problem is solved by introducing 
the term implicit belief, that is, a belief that is not explicitly represented in the mind, but can 
be swiftly derived from other beliefs [1]. It is sometimes suggested that beliefs are not 
linguistic at all, but instead take on a map-like structure [1]. This way, if I had simply a 
“map” of the solar system in mind, I need only look at that to determine there are 8 planets, 
and that there are less than 9, and less than 10, etc. 
But is this map now a representation of a belief, or is it something else from which beliefs are 
formed? Is it fair to say that I’ve always had the belief that our solar system has less than 329 
planets, despite this being the first time I have thought about this particular number? Is this 
belief represented somewhere in my mind or does it form only when I take this particular 
proposition into consideration? Seeing how these questions pertain to belief prior to any 
behaviour it (supposedly) spurs, it seems sensible to look within a working mind – not by 
analysing the behaviour of somebody else’s but the intentions of our own. In order to try and 
find an answer, I turn towards the first-person perspective on belief, towards the 
phenomenological tradition. 
In this article I very roughly sketch out some ideas from the field of phenomenology that 
might provide an account of, or at least some clues towards, what it is like to have beliefs. In 
order to home in towards an answer, this investigation touches upon many phenomena related 
to beliefs, such as knowledge, expectation, meaning, learning and others. However, quite 
early in this examination of a phenomenology of belief a problem with our presuppositions 
arises. Phenomenological accounts (most notably that of Edmund Husserl, on whose work 
almost all of phenomenology stands) presented in this article seem to suggest that the idea of 
perceiving belief as represented (or itself a representation) is incompatible with the first-
person perspective. What is perhaps needed, then, before delving more seriously into the 
phenomenology of belief, is a different way of thinking about beliefs. As it happens, one such 
way arises from phenomenology itself. 
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HORIZON OF IMPLICIT BELIEFS 
To begin with, let us look at an example of a phenomenological explanation of belief and its 
related phenomena. For this purpose, I present Husserl’s concept of the horizon – a very 
broad concept that could not possibly be exhaustively explained in such a short article. I will 
therefore only attempt to provide a rough sketch that should communicate the gist of 
Husserl’s idea. 
Husserl usually describes the horizon in the context of experiencing a certain object. This 
experience of the object is “partly surrounded by a dimly conscious horizon of undetermined 
reality” [3; p.49]. The horizon, in this sense, is what we are co-conscious1 of besides our 
experience of an object. As I2 am writing this, my attention is on the screen and the letters 
appearing there as I type, but somewhere on the periphery of my attention (the horizon) is an 
awareness of my body, an awareness of the table and wall behind the screen, an awareness of 
the room behind me, etc. 
In a somewhat similar sense, the horizon appears in Husserl’s analysis of time consciousness. 
Gallagher and Zahavi [3] summarise Husserl’s argumentation that experiencing is not made 
up of a series of consecutive discrete experiences. In order to experience temporal continuity, 
we need to in every moment be aware of moment before (what Husserl calls retention), as 
well as have some sort of anticipation of what might occur next (protention). This co-
awareness cannot be, as Gallagher and Zahavi [3] stress, simply remembering what was or 
imagining what will be. Remembering and imagining are activities unto themselves and we 
do not perform them every waking moment. Gallagher and Zahavi [3] provide the example of 
hearing a melody. It does not occur so that I hear a note, that note completely vanishes from 
my conscious experience and then the experience of a new note appears. “Rather, 
consciousness retains the sense of the first note as I hear the second note, a hearing that is 
also enriched by an anticipation of the next note” [3; p.84]. My experience of the note E flat 
by itself is very different than when it is preceded by the note G three times (as they together 
make for the distinctive four-note motif of Beethoven’s 5th Symphony). Upon hearing the E 
flat, I do not remember what it was like to hear the three Gs, rather, their experience still 
lingers as E flat rings. This co-experiencing of the passing shadow of the just past and an 
inkling of what is coming is what could also be understood as the horizon. 
Furthermore, the importance of expectations in the horizon surpasses the scope of time 
consciousness. When experiencing an object, we have tacit expectations regarding further 
possible experiences connected with that object. For example, as I move to pick up a rock, I 
expect the rock to feel cold, to have a certain weight, a certain texture, etc. “When things go 
as expected, our current experiences ‘fulfill’ (erfüllen) our previous expectations … . When 
things do not go as expected, our experiences ‘frustrate’ (enttäuschen) our previous 
‘expectations’ (Erwartungen)” [5; p.124]. If, when we do eventually pick up the rock, it turns 
out to be hot, or to be very light, or to be sticky, our expectations are frustrated – we feel surprise. 
Our expectations of an object are tied to our knowledge – or “preknowledge” as Jeffrey 
Yoshimi [5] translates the German “Vorwissen” – of that object. Horizon expectations are 
thus based on type information [5]. What we expect of an object depends on our 
preknowledge of the type this objects belongs to. Oft quoted is Husserl’s example of 
encountering a dog: 
“When we see a dog, we immediately anticipate its additional modes of behavior: its typical 
way of eating, playing, running, jumping, and so on. We do not actually see its teeth; but we 
know in advance how its teeth will look – not in their individual determination but according 
to type, inasmuch as we have already had previous and frequent experience of ‘similar’ 
animals, of ‘dogs,’ that they have such things as ‘teeth’ and of this typical kind” [6; p.288]. 
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Of course, type knowledge does not provide us with specific, discrete expectations about an 
object [5]. Picking up a rock, I do not expect it to weigh exactly 0,963 kilograms and have a 
surface temperature of 14,1 C, rather my horizon expectations correspond to a range of 
possibilities. “Metaphorically, our tacit understandings are structured into what Husserl calls 
‘leeways’ or ‘latitudes’ (Spielräume) of possibilities, which we can think of as ranges of 
possible further experience” [5; p.125]. My expectations are then that this particular rock will 
be about as heavy as rocks that size usually get and coldish to the touch. Only when our 
actual experience falls outside the range of expectations do we feel surprise – e.g. when the 
rock turns out to be feather-light or warm to the touch. 
However, these ranges of horizon expectations are not set in stone. They change and adjust 
through the flow of new experiences – “the horizon is dynamic” [5; p.125]. If the rock does 
turn out to be lighter than expected, rougher than expected, warmer than expected, I adjust 
my perception of it (rather than staying paralyzed in continuous awe). It might turn out to be 
a piece of withered wood, so my horizon expectations adjust accordingly. 
When my expectations are “frustrated” and I feel surprise, I usually consciously attend to 
whatever surprised me. This conscious turning towards has then consequences in the form of 
a horizon change. To quote Yoshimi [5]: “… this changes the way the object is for us. Our 
attentive activity leaves a ‘precipitate’ or ‘sediment’ (both are translations of Niederschlag) 
that changes the way we experience the object in the future” [5; p.127]. This description is 
reminiscent of learning in the sense of adjusting existing beliefs or acquiring new ones. 
Related to the dynamic nature of the horizon is its dependence on the body – on my own 
bodily movements [5]. Backing up on my example with the rock a little, when I observe it 
from afar, I perceive it in a certain way. When I move my body to the left, my perception of 
the stone changes in a specific way; when I move to the right, it changes in another specific 
way. Husserl uses more mathematical language to describe this, describing the appearance of 
the object as a dependent variable relative to the independent variable that is bodily 
movement [5]. 
This, hopefully, captures the gist of Husserl’s concept of the horizon – a dynamic range of 
preknowledge and expectations that tacitly reside on the edge of our awareness. The tacit 
nature of the horizon is often stressed: “horizon expectations or intentions are not explicit: 
they do not involve actively thinking ‘here is what I expect’” [5; p.124]. As such, it might be 
arguable that the horizon could be comparable (though certainly not equatable) to the idea of 
implicit belief – an unarticulated presupposition of how the world is and behaves. 
Does Husserl, then, also provide an account of what might be, on the surface, juxtaposed with 
explicit belief? While there is talk of explication, and it is, in a way, contrasted with the 
horizon, a correlation with explicit beliefs seems rather daring. According to Yoshimi [5], 
Husserl used the word “explication” (Explikation), when something “becomes my object of 
thought” [5; p.127] – though it should be noted that this does not necessarily involve 
exhibiting behaviour that might be observable from the third person, such as articulating a 
proposition, or even forming a proposition in a language of thought, just becoming aware of 
that something3. 
However, this explication does not mean that a pre-existing implicit belief (or horizon 
expectation) is brought to the forefront. The horizon is not a shadowy realm of properly 
formed beliefs and directing our attention there does not illuminate these beliefs for what they 
were from the beginning. Rather, explicating means “we marshal together constituents of the 
embodied horizon structure to construct new forms of experiential object” [5; p.127]. 
Yoshimi [5] elucidates this with an example of approaching a door and having a sense of its 
width: “There was no dim version of the explicit thought ‘it is less than 5 feet wide’ before 
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we had that thought, though we would have previously been surprised were a 6 foot wide 
object to have been pushed through it” [5; p.127]. 
The notion that explicating something does not mean illuminating something that was there 
before, but creating something new from what was there, warps the idea of 
representationalism, which perceives beliefs to be, roughly, propositions stored somewhere in 
the mind. Delving deeper into what that might look like from a first-person perspective, 
phenomenologists seem to propose that what is stored are not ready-made propositions, but 
gists, notions, and feelings from which propositions are formed ad hoc, if at all. Perhaps the 
idea of ready-made representations stored within the mind ought to be relinquished, as 
Gallagher and Zahavi remark [4; p.17]: 
“if a subject is asked ‘Do you believe that p?’, the subject does not start 
searching in her mind for the belief that p. Rather, she straightforwardly 
considers whether p is or is not the case about the world. So too, in regard 
to perceiving the world, the perceiver does not have to introspect for 
perceptual representations in her mind; she can say what she perceives 
simply by consciously perceiving the world. If you were asked whether it is 
raining outside, you would look out the window rather than inside your mind”. 
COPING WITHOUT REPRESENTATIONS 
A move away from representations is also proposed by Hubert Dreyfus [7] in his explanation 
of skill acquisition, which he illustrates with examples of two hypothetical adults acquiring a 
skill through instructions, one learning to drive a car (a motor skill), the other learning to play 
chess (an intellectual skill). He divides the learning process into five stages, with the first 
stage (novice) still relying on representations such as the verbalized instruction “shift to 
second gear when the speedometer needle points to ten miles an hour” [7; p.368]. Novice 
drivers (and beginner chess players) are notoriously slow, as they have to constantly 
remember (recall the representations of) memorized rules for how to perform the 
corresponding tasks. In the descriptions of the following stages, Dreyfus [7] presents a slow 
departure from the dependence on propositional representations. He presents an example of 
an advanced beginner, in addition to looking at the speedometer, uses engine sounds (that 
cannot be simply articulated) to determine when to shift. At the third stage, there are simply 
too many rules for too many possible situations for the learner to remember. Thus, detached 
rule-following gives way to emotional involvement: a skilful response feels good, an 
unskilful one feels bad, so the learner tries to act in ways that feel good. At the fourth stage, 
intuitive behaviour starts to completely replace consciously and detachedly premeditated 
responses – “the learner simply sees what needs to be achieved” [7; p.371]. This is 
completely internalised at the fifth stage, when the expert acts completely intuitively and 
without prior reflection. When I, as a skilled driver, need to take a right turn, there is no 
conscious recollection and following of instructions to activate the turn signal, release the gas 
pedal, shift to a lower gear, and turn the steering wheel clockwise; I just go right. As Dreyfus 
himself succinctly puts it: “What must be done, simply is done” [7; p.372]. 
Dreyfus [7] leans heavily on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the intentional arc: “… 
which projects round about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, 
ideological and moral situation, or rather which results in our being situated in all these 
respects” [8; p.157]. This idea is congruent with Husserl’s concept of the horizon – where our 
preknowledge, our inklings of our situation and setting, our immediate and long-term past 
and future are co-present. Dreyfus [7] perceives the intentional arc as “the tight connection 
between the agent and the world, viz. that, as the agent acquires skills, those skills are 
‘stored’, not as representations in the mind, but as dispositions to respond to the solicitations 
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of situations in the world” [7; p.367]. To reiterate this in the context of the horizon: as we 
gain skills, those leave a ‘precipitate’ or ‘sediment’ on our horizon, which changes to 
accommodate new possibilities and expectations. In Dreyfus’ own words: “What one has 
learned appears in the way the world shows up; it is not represented in the mind and added on 
to the present experience … but is presented to the learner as a more and more finely 
discriminated situation, which then solicits a more and more refined response” [7; p.373]. 
Dreyfus takes a very cautious and conservative step away from representationalism, which is 
further cemented in his reply to comments [9]. In his model, at the start of the process of skill 
acquisition, beliefs are still represented in the mind, while the intentional arc only becomes 
relevant in the later stages. But this raises the question: am I not, since the very beginning of 
my learning process, entangled in the intentional arc, which shapes how I perceive and 
approach the world? Are the first elements of learning (the instructions) different from other 
experience in that they are represented as explicit propositional beliefs? For the proposition 
“shift to second gear when the speedometer needle points to ten miles an hour” to have 
meaning for me, I need to have a lot of implicit beliefs about, for example, what a gear is and 
how to shift, what a speedometer is and how to read it, and so on. Where is the line between 
the represented and the not represented? 
Dreyfus seems to stand above a chasm. On the one side he clings to the idea that the mind 
forms representations of an outer world. Exploring the possibility of learning without 
representations, he swings to the other side, where the world is only a projection 
(representation) of the structure of the mind. Despite denying that he has again succumbed to 
representations, he concludes his denial with: “All past experience is projected back into the 
world. The best representation of the world is thus the world itself” [7; p.373]. 
ENACTIVISM 
A more consequent distancing from representations and a daring plunge into the chasm is 
done by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch [10]. They present the two 
sides as objectivism – the world having pre-given properties that are discovered by the mind 
and represented within – and idealism – the world as a projection (or representation) of the 
structure of the mind. The middle path between these two positions is perceiving cognition as 
embodied action or enaction [10]. 
With the term embodied Varela, Thompson and Rosch emphasise that our perception of the 
world is shaped by “a body with various sensorimotor capacities, and … these individual 
sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, 
psychological, and cultural context” [10; p.173] (cf. Merleau-Ponty’s intentional arc). With 
the term action they emphasise the inseparability of sensory and motor processes. From 
recurring sensory-motor patterns emerge cognitive structures that in turn enable sensory-
motor processes [10]. How I perceive the world to be is thus neither a representation of how 
the world actually is, nor a representation of the structure of my mind, but rather a product of 
perceptually guided action [10]. 
An emphasis on the body and its actions (or possibilities for action), was already mentioned 
by Husserl [3, 6] and greatly expanded on by Merleau-Ponty [8], on whose work a lot of the 
ideas of enactivism are based. One such idea is the idea of sense-making (what Merleau-
Ponty refers to as Sinngebung), elaborated upon by Di Paolo, Rohde and De Jaegher [11]. 
The authors start from the argument that the interaction between an organism and its 
environment hold importance for the organism (with self-preservation as its goal). This 
creates a normative perspective on the world where some interactions or possibilities are 
more important than others [11]. Thus, organisms (or their cognitive systems) “cast a web of 
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significance on their world … and this is the definitional property of a cognitive system: the 
creation and appreciation of meaning or sense-making, in short” [11; p.39] (see also [12, 13]). 
Di Paolo, Rohde and De Jaegher [11] emphasise that the organism is not just a passive 
recipient of information from the environment, which is then translated into internal 
representations and evaluated: “cognitive systems are simply not in the business of accessing 
their world in order to build accurate pictures of it” [11: 39]. Meaning is not an attribute of 
the environment that is discovered or attained by the organism, and neither is it something 
from within the organism that is reflected onto the world. It is the result of an on-going 
dialogue between the environment and the organism’s embodied action (cf. [10]). The 
difference is highlighted by this quote from Heinz von Foerster [14; p.214]: 
“ ‘out there’ there is no light and no color, there are only electro-magnetic 
waves; ‘out there’ there is no sound and no music, there are only periodic 
variations of the air pressure; ‘out there’ there is no heat and no cold, there 
are only moving molecules with more or less mean kinetic energy, and so on”. 
ENACTING BELIEFS 
As has been shown from the example of Husserl, the phenomenological tradition suggests 
that the first-person perspective of beliefs is far from as simple as recalling a certain 
proposition that acts as a representation of the world. Enactivism (building on 
phenomenology) provides a framework for explaining beliefs without relying on 
representations. What is unfortunately lost with renouncing representations (and a third 
person perspective) is a relatively clear notion of what a belief is – the answer to the question: 
“What is it like to take something to be true?” 
If Husserl’s concept of the horizon is to be interpreted as being comprised of beliefs (as 
continuous and ineffable as they might be), and if an organism’s sense-making could be 
interpreted as the organism constructing beliefs about the world, belief is everywhere (and 
closer resembling an uncountable belief-substance than a set of discrete beliefs) – indeed, 
being conscious of something would mean believing it4. This nigh-synonymity would call to 
question how much sense it makes to speak of belief from a first-person perspective at all. Or, 
perhaps, belief should be perceived as something more active like the product of what 
Husserl calls explication. But, again, what does this process look like? Does it involve an 
internal language of thought or maps or something else entirely? And, in reference to 
phenomenology and enactivism’s focus on the importance of the body, is there a difference 
between believing there to be a room behind me as I am sitting behind my desk and believing 
that our solar system has less than 10 planets? 
It is clear that we need to draw new lines in the sand, but also that we need to take a closer 
look at the sand itself – not by looking at other people’s behaviour but by examining our own 
experience. Recently, experience research has been on the rise – both in the strictly 
philosophical sense and in a more empirically oriented sense, so called empirical 
phenomenology [15]. With the development of techniques for tapping into the resource that is 
human experience (e.g. [16-18]), there is hope that we might soon find some answers and 
perhaps uncover questions yet unimagined. 
REMARKS 
1I use the terms to be aware of, to be conscious of and to experience interchangeably. 
2Regarding the use of first or third person, singular or plural in examples, there is great 
2variety in the literature. Husserl [3], for example, uses the first person singular, Yoshimi [5] 
2the first person plural and Dreyfus [7] the third person singular. I myself prefer using the 
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2first person singular, so as not to presume that my experience is the same as everybody 
2else’s, and much less to assume what a third person experiences. Though, by quoting other 
2authors, a constant switching between these styles is unavoidable. 
3My previous examples regarding the horizon were not examples of genuinely experiencing 
3the horizon, but rather examples of explicating certain properties of the horizon. This is 
3similar to providing »our solar system has less than 329 planets« as an example of implicit 
3belief, even though by reflecting on it, it is no longer implicit. 
4An idea defended by Baruch Spinoza and later Daniel Gilbert [19] – sometimes referred to 
4under the name of credulism. 
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